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Abstract
A well-known rationale for representative democracy is that direct democ-
racy leads to a free-rider problem as to the collection of information. A prob-
lem with this rationale is that it takes for granted that representatives collect
information. In this paper we examine whether or not electoral competition
induces political parties or candidates to collect information about policy con-
sequences. We show that the answer to this question depends on the cost of
information collection. More surprisingly, we find that endogenizing informa-
tion may lead to divergence of policy platforms.
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1 Introduction
In most democratic societies, policy decisions are delegated to elected politicians:
in practice democracy is representative rather than direct. A well-known rationale
for representative democracy is that direct democracy leads to a serious free-rider
problem as to the collection of information. The reason is simple. The analysis
of the full consequences of policy alternatives is complicated and costly. When in
communities with many citizens decisions are made through referenda, individuals
lack incentives to examine policy consequences. The cost of collecting information
almost always exceeds the benefit, because the probability that one’s vote is decisive
is negligible. A problem with this rationale for representative democracy is that it
takes for granted that representatives do collect information.
In this paper we examine whether or not electoral competition induces political
parties or candidates to collect information about policy consequences. To this end,
we employ a simple spatial voting model, in which two parties compete for office. The
elections revolve around a single issue. As to this issue, there are three options, say,
cut spending, maintain spending and increase spending. Partly, voters’ preferences
over the three alternatives are exogenous. However, voters may change preferences
over policies when new information about their pros and cons becomes available.
Because of "rational ignorance", voters do not search for information that bears on
the pros and cons of policy options. Before elections are held, parties may collect
information. Collecting information is costly. After the two parties have had the
opportunity to find information, they simultaneously select a party platform (one
of the policy alternatives). Next, the parties campaign. In the campaign, parties
can try to make a case for their platform. Arguments in favor of one’s own platform
or arguments against the platform of the opponent, if found, can be supplied in the
campaign. After the campaign, elections are held. The winning party takes office
and implements its program.
We derive two main results. Our first result is not very surprising. Whether
or not parties collect information depends on the cost of information. If this cost
is sufficiently low, each party searches for both arguments in favor and arguments
against policy alternatives. If this cost is sufficiently high, neither party collects
information. In the intermediate case an equilibrium exists, in which one party
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searches for arguments in one direction, say increase spending, whereas the other
party searches for arguments in the other direction.
Our second result is more interesting. In the equilibrium in which one party
searches for arguments in favor of one alternative, while the other party searches
for arguments in favor of another alternative, divergence of platforms may occur.
One party either chooses "increase spending" or "status quo", depending on the
information it has found, while the other party either chooses "decrease spending"
or "status quo". It is worth emphasizing that this result is obtained under the
assumption that parties primarily care about winning the elections.
This paper is closely related to the literature on pre-election politics. In this
literature, the essential policy decisions are made before the elections (Persson and
Tabellini, 2000). An important result is that electoral competition between two
parties or candidates leads to convergence of platforms (Downs, 1957). Calvert
(1985) argues that this result is robust by pointing out that if parties care about
policy outcomes (rather than about winning elections) they also tend to choose
the same policy platform.1 We show that endogenizing information may affect the
convergent result.
Our paper also builds on Dewatripont and Tirole (1999), henceforth DT. DT
consider a situation in which a decision maker is uncertain about the pros and cons
of alternative policies. They argue that it could be efficient for an organization to
let advocates of specific interests collect information about the pros and cons of
alternative policy options. The reason is that stakes in the decision process create
strong incentives for agents to collect information. An important difference between
DT and our paper is that, in our paper agents are driven by electoral motives,
whereas in DT agents are driven by monetary rewards.
This paper is organized as follows. The next section discusses the model. Section
3 describes the equilibria. Section 4 concludes.
1Alesina and Rosenthal (1995) argue that the convergent result is not as robust as Calvert
suggests. A basic assumption underlying Calvert’s result is that parties can make credible com-
mitments to carry out announced campaign promises after being elected. If parties are unable to
make precommitments, even a small amount of policy preferences breaks down the convergent out-
come. Alesina (1988) shows that complete or partial convergence can only occur if the interaction
between parties is modelled as an infinitely repeated game.
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2 The model
We consider a society inhabited by a continuum of voters. Each voter i has quadratic
preferences over policy, X. There are three alternative policies: X ∈ {−1, 0, 1}.
Voter i’s preferences are represented by
Ui = −
£
X −
¡
Xdi + θ
¢¤2
(1)
where Xdi denotes the voter’s type and θ is a stochastic term. This term consists of
two parts:
θ = θA + θB
where θA is equal to −z or 0 with equal probability, and θB is equal to z or 0 with
equal probability. In (1), Xdi + θ denotes voter i’s bliss point. The stochastic term
θ reflects that voters are uncertain about policy consequences. A straightforward
interpretation of θA is that there might be arguments for restrictive policy (X = −1).
Likewise, θB captures that there might be arguments for intensifying policy (X = 1).
We assume that θA and θB contain hard information that can be conveyed to voters.
The position of the median voter is given by Xdm = 0.
Two parties, denoted by L and R, compete for office. Before the elections,
each party can learn the values of the stochastic terms. For each party, there are
four alternatives. First, at a cost C2 (j = L,R) party J learns both θA and θB,
LJ = AB. Second and third, at a cost C1 < C2, party J learns either θA (LJ = A)
or θB (LJ = B). Finally, party J can decide to learn nothing (LJ = 0).
After the parties have had the opportunities to learn the stochastic terms, they
simultaneously select their party platforms,XJ = {−1, 0, 1}. We assume that parties
select XJ with a view to win the election. Formally, party J selects XJ so as to
maximize πJ , where πJ is the probability that party J wins the election. Parties
care about policy outcomes in case policy outcomes do not affect their chances of
winning the elections. In that case, party L prefers X = −1 to X = 0 and X = 0
to X = 1, while party R prefers X = 1 to X = 0 and X = 0 to X = −1. Parties
have thus lexicographic preferences: policy outcomes matter only if they do not
affect parties’ chances of winning the elections. We assume that party platforms
are binding. If elected, party J implements the platform it has announced. The
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preferences of party J are represented by
UJ = λπJ − C
where λ denotes the value of holding office.
Before the elections, the parties campaign. In the campaign, parties try to make
a case for their platform. Depending on what parties have learned about the sto-
chastic terms, they can supply arguments in favor of their own platform or supply
arguments against the platform of their opponent. We assume that information
about the stochastic terms can be concealed, but cannot be forged. After the cam-
paign elections are held, in which voters choose between the two parties. In our
model, preferences are single-peaked. It is well-known that in such a model the
choice of the median voter is decisive. From now on, we will treat our model as a
game with three players, Party L, party R and the median voter, voter M .
3 Equilibrium
This section presents the equilibria of our game. Each equilibrium identifies the
strategy of each party, i.e. it describes a party’s decision about the information
it collects, the platform it selects and the information it supplies in the campaign.
Moreover, an equilibrium describes how the median voter updates his beliefs about
the stochastic terms, and for which party he votes. In equilibrium, the strategies of
the parties and the median voter are optimal responses to each other, and beliefs
are updated according to Bayes’ Rule.
On the basis of the cost of information collection and the value of z, three equilib-
ria in pure strategies and one equilibrium in mixed strategies can be distinguished.
Proposition 1 gives the conditions under which an equilibrium exists in which both
parties investigate both stochastic terms.
Proposition 1 Suppose C2 < 14λ and z >
1
2
. Then, an equilibrium exists in which
LL = LR = AB; the following platforms are chosen: XL = XR = 0 if θA = 0
and θB = 0, XL = XR = −1 if θA = −z and θB = 0, XL = XR = 1 if θA = 0
and θB = z and XL = XR = 0 if θA = −z and θB = z. If found, parties supply
information about the pros and cons of policy alternatives.
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Proof. The proof of this proposition and other propositions can be found in the
Appendix.
Proposition 1 states that if the cost of collecting full information is low and z is
sufficiently large, then parties are willing to incur the cost of learning the full con-
sequences of alternative policies. Moreover, under those conditions parties choose
the same platforms. The intuition behind Proposition 1 is straightforward. If z is
sufficiently large, information about the pros and cons of policies may convince the
median voter that X = 0 is not optimal. Being better informed about policy conse-
quences may thus be the key to office. If a party finds arguments in favor or against
a policy, supplying this information to voters weakly dominates not supplying this
information. Weakly, because the other party may supply the same information.
Under the conditions stated in Proposition 1, parties and voters are eventually fully
informed. It is therefore not surprising that, as in conventional spatial voting mod-
els, party platforms fully converge.
In the case that the cost of collecting full information is sufficiently high, parties
will only collect partial information if the cost of collecting partial information is
low and z is sufficiently large. The conditions under which this equilibrium holds,
are discussed in Proposition 2.
Proposition 2 Suppose 1
4
λ + C1 < C2 < 12λ, C1 <
1
4
λ and z > 1
2
. Then, an
equilibrium exists in which LL = A and LR = B; the following platforms are chosen:
party L chooses XL = 0 if θA = 0 and XL = −1 if θA = −z and party R chooses
XR = 0 if θB = 0 and XR = 1 if θB = z. If found, party L supplies information
about the pros of X = −1 and party R supplies information about the pros of X = 1.
Proposition 2 describes an equilibrium in which party L searches for arguments
in favor of restrictive policy (θA) and party R searches for arguments in favor of
intensifying policy (θB). In this case parties have asymmetric information, party L
learns θA and party R learns θB. The choice of platforms depends on the information
parties find. Party L chooses "decrease spending" if it finds arguments in favor of
this policy alternative and else it chooses "status quo". Party R, on the other hand,
chooses "increase spending" if it finds arguments in favor of this policy alternative
and else it chooses "status quo". Full convergence of political platforms only occurs
if neither one of the parties finds arguments in favor of the policy alternative it has
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investigated.
Finally, if collecting information is too costly, parties decide to learn nothing.
Proposition 3 shows under which conditions both parties decide to learn nothing.
As in conventional spatial-voting models, the choice of platforms depends only on
the position of the median voter. It is not surprising that both parties choose the
platform X = 0. Parties also decide not to search for information if z is small
enough.
Proposition 3 Suppose collecting information is too costly (C1 > 14λ) or z <
1
2
.
Then, an equilibrium exists in which parties decide not to collect information (LL =
LR = 0). The following platforms are chosen: XL = XR = 0.
In Propositions 1,2 and 3 we have seen under which conditions political parties
collect full information, partial information or no information. There is one equilib-
rium that we have not discussed yet. Suppose that the costs of collecting information
are 1
4
λ < C2 < 14λ + C1 and C1 <
1
4
λ, then an equilibrium in pure strategies does
not exist. There exists an equilibrium in which parties randomize between collecting
full information, collecting partial information and collecting no information. This
equilibrium is described in Proposition 4.
Proposition 4 Suppose 1
4
λ < C2 < 14λ + C1, C1 <
1
4
λ and z > 1
2
. Then, an
equilibrium in mixed strategies exists. Party L (R) chooses LL = AB (LR = AB)
with probability
1
4
λ−C1
1
4
λ , LL = A (LR = B) with probability
C2− 14λ
1
4
λ and LL = 0 (LR =
0) with probability C1−C2+
1
4
λ
1
4
λ . The choice of platforms depends on the information
parties have collected. There are nine possible outcomes.
To understand proposition 4 let us first consider the payoff matrix parties face
in the first stage.
LR = AB LR = B LR = 0
LL = AB 12λ− C2,
1
2
λ− C2 34λ− C2,
1
4
λ− C1 34λ− C2,
1
4
λ
LL = A 14λ− C1,
3
4
λ− C2 12λ− C1,
1
2
λ− C1 34λ− C1,
1
4
λ
LL = 0 14λ,
3
4
λ− C2 14λ,
3
4
λ− C1 12λ,
1
2
λ
Proposition 4 states that there does not exist an equilibrium in pure strategies if
1
4
λ < C2 < 14λ+ C1, C1 <
1
4
λ and z > 1
2
. The reason is that parties always have an
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incentive to deviate. Suppose that party L collects full information, then party R
prefers to collect no information. But, given that party R collects no information,
party L achieves a higher payoff by collecting partial information. And, given that
party L collects partial information, party R prefers to collect full information.
In equilibrium both parties randomize between collecting full information, par-
tial information and no information. The intuition behind this equilibrium is that
collecting full information is costly. Therefore parties only want to collect full infor-
mation if the other party is collecting partial information. In the other cases parties
prefer to collect either partial information or no information. Because parties de-
cide simultaneously how much information to collect, they are uncertain about the
amount of information the other party is going to collect. Therefore collecting full
information, collecting partial information and collecting no information can all be
a best response. Parties play each of the three actions with positive probability.
Proposition 4 presents the probabilities of collecting full information, partial
information and no information. The probabilities depend on the value of holding
office (λ) and on the costs of collecting information. First we consider the effect of
a change in λ on the probability of collecting full, partial or no information. The
parameter λ has a positive effect on the probability of collecting full information.
So, political parties have a stronger incentive to collect full information if the value
of office (λ) increases. The intuition is that as λ increases, winning the elections
becomes more important to parties. And, by collecting full information, parties can
increase the probability of winning the elections. Besides the effect on the probability
of collecting full information, changing λ also affects the probability of collecting
partial information and the probability of collecting no information. The parameter
λ has a negative effect on the probability of collecting partial information and a
positive effect on the probability of collecting no information. These findings can be
explained by the positive effect of λ on the probability of collecting full information.
We have already seen that given that one party collects full information, the other
party is best off collecting no information. This means that if the probability of
collecting full information increases as λ increases, the probability of collecting no
information also increases. In a similar way we can explain that the probability of
collecting partial information decreases as λ increases.
Next, let us consider the effect of a change in the cost of information on the prob-
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ability of collecting full information. The probability of collecting full information
only depends on the cost of collecting partial information. As the cost of collecting
partial information increases, the probability of collecting full information decreases.
The reason is that as the cost of collecting partial information increases, collecting
partial information becomes more costly resulting in a weaker incentive to collect
partial information. We have already shown that collecting full information is only
a best response if the other party collects partial information. This means that a
weaker incentive to collect partial information reduces the probability of collecting
full information. Surprising is that the probability of collecting full information
does not depend on the cost of collecting full information. The reason is that two
opposite effects play a role. On the one hand, parties have a weaker incentive to
collect full information if the cost of collecting full information increases. On the
other hand, the cost of collecting full information has a positive effect on the proba-
bility of collecting partial information. And, collecting partial information is a best
response, given that the other party collects no information. In a similar way we
can explain the effect of a change in the cost of information on the probability of
collecting partial information and on the probability of collecting no information
4 Conclusion
In this paper we have analyzed under which conditions electoral competition induces
political parties to collect information. We have considered a model of electoral
competition in which parties are allowed to collect information before elections take
place. In the electoral campaign, parties can use the information, if found, to make
a case for their platform. With respect to the preferences of parties we have assumed
that parties care only about winning the elections.
We have shown that whether or not parties collect information depends on the
cost of information. More surprisingly, we find that endogenizing information may
lead to divergence of policy platforms.
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5 Appendix
Proofs
In this appendix, we show under which conditions parties collect full information,
partial information or decide to learn nothing. Parties face nine feasible outcomes.
We treat each outcome separately.
Case 1. Suppose LL = LR = AB. Each party has full information about the
alternative policies. If z > 1
2
, party L and R choose XL = XR = 0 if θA = 0 and
θB = 0, XL = XR = −1 if θA = −z and θB = 0, XL = XR = 1 if θA = 0 and
θB = z and XL = XR = 0 if θA = −z and θB = z. The payoffs of both parties equal
1
2
λ − C2. If z < 12 , the parties choose XL = XR = 0. The payoffs of both parties
equal 1
2
λ− C2.
Case 2. Suppose LL = AB and LR = B. Then party L learns θA and θB and
party R only learns θB. If z > 12 , party L chooses XL = 0 if θA = 0 and θB = 0,
XL = −1 if θA = −z and θB = 0, XL = 1 if θA = 0 and θB = z and XL = 0 if
θA = −z and θB = z. Party R chooses XR = 1 if θB = z and XR = 0 if θB = 0. If
party R learns that θB = z, X = 0 and X = 1 yield the same expected probability
of winning the elections. Because of the lexicographic preference relation of parties,
party R prefers X = 1. If θB = 0, X = 0 and X = −1 yield the same probability of
winning. In this case party R prefers X = 0. The payoff of party L equals 3
4
λ− C2
and the payoff of party R equals 1
4
λ−C1. If z < 12 , the parties choose XL = XR = 0.
The payoff of party L equals 1
2
λ− C2 and the payoff of party R equals 12λ− C1.
Case 3. Suppose LL = AB and LR = 0. Then only party L learns θA and θB
and party R learns nothing. If z > 1
2
, party L chooses XL = 0 if θA = 0 and θB = 0,
XL = −1 if θA = −z and θB = 0, XL = 1 if θA = 0 and θB = z and XL = 0 if
θA = −z and θB = z. Party R choosesXR = 0. The payoff of party L equals 34λ−C2
and the payoff of party R equals 1
4
λ. If z < 1
2
, the parties choose XL = XR = 0.
The payoff of party L equals 1
2
λ− C2 and the payoff of party R equals 12λ.
Case 4. Suppose LL = A and LR = AB. Then party L only learns θA and
party R learns θA and θB. If z > 12 , party R chooses XR = 0 if θA = 0 and θB = 0,
XR = −1 if θA = −z and θB = 0, XR = 1 if θA = 0 and θB = z and XR = 0 if
θA = −z and θB = z. Party L chooses XL = −1 if θA = −z and XL = 0 if θA = 0.
The payoff of party R equals 3
4
λ− C2 and the payoff of party L equals 14λ− C1. If
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z < 1
2
, the parties choose XL = XR = 0. The payoff of party R equals 12λ− C2 and
the payoff of party L equals 1
2
λ− C1.
Case 5. Suppose LL = 0 and LR = AB. Then only party R learns θA and
θB and party L learns nothing. If z > 12 , party R chooses XR = 0 if θA = 0 and
θB = 0, XR = −1 if θA = −z and θB = 0, XR = 1 if θA = 0 and θB = z and XR = 0
if θA = −z and θB = z. Party L chooses XL = 0. The payoff of party R equals
3
4
λ−C2 and the payoff of party L equals 14λ. If z <
1
2
, parties choose XL = XR = 0.
The payoff of party R equals 1
2
λ− C2 and the payoff of party L equals 12λ.
Case 6. Suppose LL = A and LR = B. Then party L learns θA and party R
learns θB. If z > 12 , party L chooses XL = −1 if θA = −z and XL = 0 if θA = 0.
Party R chooses XR = 1 if θB = z and XR = 0 if θB = 0. The payoffs of both
parties equal 1
2
λ − C1. If z < 12 , the parties choose XL = XR = 0. The payoffs of
both parties equal 1
2
λ− C1.
Case 7. Suppose LL = A and LR = 0. Then party L learns θA and party R
learns nothing. If z > 1
2
, party L chooses XL = −1 if θA = −z and XL = 0 if
θA = 0. Party R chooses XR = 0. The payoff of party L equals 34λ − C1 and the
payoff of party R equals 1
4
λ. If z < 1
2
, the parties choose XL = XR = 0. The payoff
of party L equals 1
2
λ− C1 and the payoff of party R equals 12λ.
Case 8. Suppose LL = 0 and LR = B. Then party L learns nothing and party
R learns θB. If z > 12 , party R chooses XR = 1 if θB = z and XR = 0 if θB = 0.
Party L chooses XL = 0. The payoff of party R equals 34λ − C1 and the payoff of
party L equals 1
4
λ. If z < 1
2
, parties choose XL = XR = 0. The payoff of party R
equals 1
2
λ− C1 and the payoff of party L equals 12λ.
Case 9. Suppose LL = LR = 0. Then parties choose XL = XR = 0. The payoffs
of both parties equal 1
2
λ.
For z > 1
2
we have summarized the cases in a payoff matrix.
LR = AB LR = B LR = 0
LL = AB 12λ− C2,
1
2
λ− C2 34λ− C2,
1
4
λ− C1 34λ− C2,
1
4
λ
LL = A 14λ− C1,
3
4
λ− C2 12λ− C1,
1
2
λ− C1 34λ− C1,
1
4
λ
LL = 0 14λ,
3
4
λ− C2 14λ,
3
4
λ− C1 12λ,
1
2
λ
Proof of Proposition 1
Suppose z > 1
2
and C2 < 14λ. Then investigating both parts of the stochastic term
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strictly dominates not investigating the stochastic term. The strategy investigate
both parts also dominates the strategy investigate only one part of the stochastic
term (C2 < 14λ+ C1). This means that independent of the choice of party L, party
R always chooses to investigate both parts if C2 < 14λ. The same is true for party
L.
If z > 1
2
, both parties collect full information if C2 < 14λ. The following platforms
are chosen: XL = XR = 0 if θA = 0 and θB = 0, XL = XR = −1 if θA = −z and
θB = 0, XL = XR = 1 if θA = 0 and θB = z and XL = XR = 0 if θA = −z and
θB = z . QED
Proof of Proposition 2
Suppose z > 1
2
, 1
4
λ + C1 < C2 < 12λ and C1 <
1
4
λ. Then investigating both
parts is too costly. Neither one of the parties will collect full information. The
strategy investigate both parts of the stochastic term is dominated by the strategy
investigate only one part. We can restrict our attention to the last four cases (case
6, 7, 8 and 9). If C1 < 14λ, the strategy investigate one part of the stochastic term
strictly dominates the strategy not investigate the stochastic term. Given that party
L investigates θA, party R will investigate θB if 12λ − C1 >
1
4
λ (C1 < 14λ). Given
that party L does not investigate θA, party R will investigate θB if 34λ − C1 >
1
2
λ
(C1 < 14λ). The same can be done to determine the optimal strategy of party L.
If z > 1
2
, parties investigate one part of the stochastic term if C1 < 14λ and
1
4
λ+C1 < C2 < 12λ. The following platforms are chosen: party L chooses XL = −1
if θA = −z and XL = 0 if θA = 0 and party R chooses XR = 1 if θB = z and XR = 0
if θB = 0. QED
Proof of Proposition 3
Suppose z > 1
2
and C1 > 14λ. Then both parties decide to learn nothing. Both
parties choose the platform which lies closest to the median voter, XL = XR = 0.
Also if z < 1
2
, parties decide not to collect information. If z < 1
2
, investigating
the stochastic term is strictly dominated by not investigating the stochastic term
(1
2
λ− C1 < 12λ). QED
Proof of Proposition 4
Suppose z > 1
2
, 1
4
λ < C2 < 14λ+ C1 and C1 <
1
4
λ. Then there is no equilibrium
in pure strategies. To find an equilibrium in mixed strategies we define α as the
probability that LR = AB, β as the probability that LR = B and γ = 1 − α − β
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as the probability that LR = 0. The payoff to party L, of choosing respectively
LL = AB, LL = A and LL = 0, is:
Π (AB) =
µ
1
2
λ− C2
¶
α+
µ
3
4
λ− C2
¶
β +
µ
3
4
λ− C2
¶
(1− α− β)
=
3
4
λ− C2 −
1
4
λα
Π (A) =
µ
1
4
λ− C1
¶
α+
µ
1
2
λ− C1
¶
β +
µ
3
4
λ− C1
¶
(1− α− β)
=
3
4
λ− C1 −
1
2
λα− 1
4
λβ
Π (0) = 1
4
λα+ 1
4
β − 1
2
(1− α− β)
=
1
2
λ− 1
4
λα− 1
4
λβ
For a mixed strategy to be an equilibrium we must have that party L is indifferent
between LL = AB, LL = A and LL = 0. This occurs if:
α =
1
4
λ− C1
1
4
λ
β =
C2 − 14λ
1
4
λ
γ =
1
4
λ+ C1 − C2
1
4
λ
Due to symmetry we find the same probabilities for party L. Party L (R) chooses
LL = AB (LR = AB) with probability
1
4
λ−C1
1
4
λ , LL = A (LR = B) with probability
C2− 14λ
1
4
λ and LL = 0 (LR = 0) with probability
C1−C2+14λ
1
4
λ . The choice of platforms
depends on the information parties have collected in the first stage. All nine cases
have a positive probability of occurring. The probabilities of collecting full informa-
tion, collecting partial information and collecting no information lie between 0 and
1 if the following conditions hold:
0 < α < 1 if 0 < C1 <
1
4
λ
0 < β < 1 if 1
4
λ < C2 <
1
2
λ
0 < γ < 1 if C1 < C2 <
1
4
λ+ C1
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If one of the conditions is not satisfied, parties choose one of three equilibria in
pure strategies discussed in Propositions 1, 2 and 3. Suppose C1 > 14λ. Then both
parties decide to learn nothing, because it gives the highest payoff. This equilibrium
is discussed in Proposition 3. Suppose that C1 < 14λ and C2 >
1
4
λ+C1. Then both
parties collect partial information. This equilibrium is discussed in Proposition 2.
Finally, suppose that C1 < 14λ and C2 <
1
4
λ. Then both parties will collect full
information (Proposition 1). QED
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